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DOUBLE STANDARD: HOW DOJ FLOUTS THE NO-CONTACT
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
LAWRENCE OLIVER II*

T

INTRODUCTION

O be admitted to practice law in any state of the United States, as well
as the District of Columbia, the applicant must have demonstrated a
comprehension of the applicable Rules of Professional Responsibility.
Fundamental among these rules is the prohibition from engaging in ex
parte communications with a represented party.1 Put plainly, if a lawyer
knows that a person is represented by counsel, the lawyer is barred from
making contact with the person in connection with the subject matter of
the representation without first obtaining permission from the person’s
counsel.2 The rule promotes the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship by preventing outside lawyers from gaining access to privileged communications or from eliciting statements or information from a
represented person—damaging or otherwise—without the participation
of that person’s counsel.3 The rule covers not only persons who are represented in their individual capacities but employees of corporations who
are represented by company counsel in connection with company subject
matter.4 And it applies to government lawyers in their attempts to contact
represented persons, as well. While there is an exception to the rule for
government lawyers directing legitimate covert investigative activities,
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers routinely violate the
rule with impunity in non-covert contexts by making overt ex parte contacts5 with represented persons, creating essentially a double standard in
relation to other lawyers. This Article explores the evolution of this
double standard and makes the case for its discontinuance.
* Lawrence Oliver II is a former federal prosecutor and the former head of
legal investigations for The Boeing Company. Mr. Oliver is a frequent speaker
across the country on subjects of government and internal investigations, ethics
and compliance.
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016).
2. Id.
3. See id. cmt. 1.
4. Id. cmt. 7.
5. See United States v. Beck, No. 1:19-CR-0184-MHC-JSA, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
214705, *8-9 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2019 (“The distinction between overt or express
lawyer or law enforcement contact, and covert or undercover contacts such as
through a secretly-cooperating informant, is important. The latter typically involves merely ‘engaging in a conversation with an individual [that a suspect] believed to be his ally against the prosecution.’ . . . [And where the suspect is] less
likely to feel intimidated by a power imbalance with a lawyer, and less likely to be
subject to ‘artful’ interrogation by a lawyer (or a lawyer’s agent).” (first alteration
in original) (internal citations omitted)).
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I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is a centuries-old bedrock doctrine of
American jurisprudence.6 It protects from disclosure to third parties confidential communications between a lawyer and client where such protection has not otherwise been waived.7 The rationale behind the doctrine
instructs:
[T]he rule has been founded in the interest of the administration of justice and is intended to enable a client to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in his attorney in matters
affecting his rights and obligations without danger of having disclosures forced . . . .8
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,9 the United States Supreme Court validated the application of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.10 While some jurisdictions previously had limited the privilege to
exist just between company counsel and “decisionmakers” or the “control
group,”11 the Upjohn decision expanded the privilege’s reach in the corporate context to also protect communications between company counsel
and other employees where the “communications concerned matters
within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and the employees
themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice.”12 In fact, in postUpjohn corporate internal investigations conducted at the direction of
company counsel, it is standard for the lawyer to issue a so-called “Upjohn
Warning” before commencement of the interview. This warning admonishes the employee/interviewee that the content of the interview is protected under the attorney-client privilege, that the privilege is held by the
company, and that the content of the interview should therefore be
treated with utmost confidence.13
6. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law.”); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940); 58 AM.
JUR. Witnesses § 462 (1948).
7. See supra note 6.
8. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice
or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”); 58
AM. JUR. Witnesses § 462.
9. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 390–94.
12. Id. at 394.
13. See, e.g., GLOSSARY (2021) Thomson Reuters, Practical Law.
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II. EX PARTE COMMUNICATION
Other legal and ethical protections are in place to further preserve
the attorney-client privilege. For example, improperly obtained privileged
information is not discoverable in litigation or admissible in court,14 and
is subject to suppression in criminal matters.15 Of significance here, Rule
4.2 (commonly referred to as the “no-contact rule”) of the Model Rules
Professional of Responsibility prohibits ex parte communications between
a lawyer and a person represented by counsel:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by
law or a court order.16
The comments to Rule 4.2 make clear the rationale behind the rule:
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by
a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those
lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled
disclosure of information relating to the representation.17
Consistent with Upjohn, Rule 4.2 applies to organizations:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the
14. See FED. R. CIV P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. EVID. 502.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Koerber, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2013).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016) (emphasis
added). The well-understood and uncontested scenario that most typically comes
under the “authorized by law” exception involves the government prosecutor directing, through the use of federal agents, informants and cooperating witness,
covert investigative activities. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 684 F. App’x 685
(10th Cir. 2017) (under Wyoming’s no-contact rule, proper for prosecutors to use
informants to communicate with represented suspects); United States v. Brown,
595 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2010) (fictious letter created by the government to influence
a recorded conversation between a confidential informant and a suspect did not
violate the Model Rules as part of a pre-indictment investigation); United States v.
Powe, 9 F.3d 68 (9th Cir. 1993) (prosecution did not violate ethical rules by using
informant to talk to a suspect); Fesenmaier v. Cameron-Ehlen Grp., Inc., 442 F.
Supp. 3d 1101 (D. Minn. 2020) (no violation of Minnesota no-contact rule where
relator in qui tam action was directed by DOJ/FBI to surreptitiously record conversations with represented person).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016); see
also United States v. Binder, 167 F. Supp. 2d 862, 865 (E.D.N.C. 2001) (“Rule
4.2(a) is simply a codification of the century old principle that an attorney must
not communicate with an opposing party who is represented by counsel.”).
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organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in
connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.18
Because of the reach of agency principles such as respondeat superior, the
range of acts or omissions that can be imputed to an organization—and
the number and type of employees this can touch—is vast.19 Each jurisdiction has adopted the essence of this prohibition, if not virtually identical language, in its respective Rules of Professional Responsibility.20
III. HISTORY

OF THE

NO-CONTACT RULE
JUSTICE

AND THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

By federal statute, government lawyers are bound by the ethics rules,
including “no-contact” rules, in those jurisdictions where they conduct enforcement activity or are licensed to practice law (“McDade Amendment”
or “Citizens Protection Act”).21 Prior to passage of the McDade Amendment in 1998, DOJ lawyers, at the express declaration of the Attorney General of the United States (AG), considered themselves outside the reach of
these basic ethics rules. Specifically, AG Dick Thornburgh, in the nowinfamous 1989 memo to all DOJ litigators, exempted government lawyers
from state ethics rules that barred contact with represented persons:
[I]t is the Department’s position that contact with a represented
individual in the course of authorized law enforcement activity
does not violate DR 7-104. The Department will resist, on
Supremacy Clause grounds, local attempts to curb legitimate federal law enforcement techniques . . . . Accordingly, an attorney employed by the Department, and any individual acting at
the direction of that attorney, is authorized to contact or communicate with any individual in the course of an investigation or
prosecution unless the contact or communication is prohibited by the Constitution, statute, Executive Order, or applicable
federal regulation.22
Subsequently, in 1994, AG Janet Reno sought to promulgate a rule in
the Code of Federal Regulations that pulled back somewhat from a com18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 cmt 7 (AM. BAR. ASS’N) (emphasis
added).
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR § 2.04 (AM.
LAW INST. 2006).
20. See Additional Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Resources, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/
links_of_interest/ [https://perma.cc/YR6J-8UZM] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998).
22. In re John Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489, 493 (D.N.M. 1992) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the Thornburgh
Memo.)
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plete exemption from the no-contact rules for government lawyers by limiting the prohibition to high-level decisionmakers:
A communication with a current employee of an organization
that qualifies as a represented party or represented person shall
be considered to be a communication with the organization for
purposes of this part only if the employee is a controlling individual. A
‘controlling individual’ is a current high level employee who is known by
the government to be participating as a decision maker in the determination of the organization’s legal position in the proceeding or
investigation of the subject matter.23
This regulation was challenged in United States ex rel. O’Keefe,24 where
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding that AG Reno lacked authority to issue the regulation without a statutory basis.25 As a result, under Missouri’s no-contact
rule, DOJ’s ex parte contacts with McDonnell Douglas employees via a
questionnaire that went to the heart of the issue being investigated, and
whose answers could be imputed to the organization in the government’s
civil false claims investigation, were prohibited.26 Following DOJ’s defeat
in O’Keefe, Congress moved swiftly to address the situation.27 Congress’s
repudiation of DOJ’s efforts to exempt itself from governing ethics rules
led to passage of the McDade Amendment in 1998.28
IV. DOJ PRACTICES—POST-MCDADE
Examining DOJ’s practices in the area of overt ex parte contacts since
enactment of the McDade Amendment, as well as its related advocacy in
the courts, leads to the conclusion that despite early attempts to comply
with the no-contact rules that every lawyer is obliged to follow, DOJ has
inexorably backslidden to a position that amounts to a double standard
for government lawyers. Sadly, today’s practices are too reminiscent of the
23. 28 C.F.R. § 77.10(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
24. 132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir 1998).
25. Id. at 1257.
26. Id.
27. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 4276 Before the H. Comm. on the
Whole House on the State of the Union, 105th Cong. (1998) 7232 (remarks of
Rep. Kanjorski) (“[T]he prosecutors in the United States today, whether they be
special counsels or regular prosecutors, have shown us that they are going to push
it to the end of the envelope and beyond. They are going to write their own definition of what standards are.”); id. at 7233(remarks of Rep. King) (“Prosecutors are
out of control. They are ruining the civil liberties of people in this country”); id. at
7234 (remarks of Rep. Fowler) (“Time and time again it has come to my attention
that Department of Justice lawyers have conducted themselves in a questionable
manner while representing the Federal Government without any penalty
or oversight.”).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998).
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culture and attitudes that existed before the McDade Amendment, a mere
twenty-three years ago.
It should be noted as an initial matter that there is a lack of empirical
evidence for the proposition that DOJ litigators routinely, overtly contact
represented persons without first gaining permission or even notifying the
person’s counsel. This is especially true for employees of corporations
that are targets of government investigations, who often are represented
by company counsel. The supporting evidence exists anecdotally but is
nevertheless widespread and commonly understood. And while DOJ annually trumpets its dollar haul in fines and penalties from organizations
who cop to wrongdoing, we will not find included in these pronouncements any statistics regarding the means used to achieve the end, i.e., how
often DOJ helped to make its case by overtly contacting represented persons without going through those persons’ counsel.29 In other words, we
are invited to marvel at the finished sausage but don’t necessarily see the
unsavory way in which the sausage was made.
Often, these unsolicited contacts are made in connection with the service of a subpoena for testimony or company documents in the employee’s
possession, which turns into interviews of the employees by government
agents that go to the merits of the issues under investigation.30 These
interviews are conducted (or attempted) despite the government’s actual
knowledge, or well-founded understanding, that these employees (1) are
represented by company or individual counsel, and (2) might make incriminating statements that could be imputed to the corporation—the
very things the attorney-client relationship along with Rule 4.2 are intended forestall. As previously stated, this scenario is distinct from the
sanctioned use of well-established covert investigative tools that typically
involve the use of informants or cooperating witnesses, or a whistleblower
employee who affirmatively reaches out to the government to report alleged wrongdoing.31
29. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD SECTION: YEAR IN REVIEW 2020 (2021) (reporting $8.9 billion paid out globally in fines and penalties, including $4.4 billion
in the U.S.).
30. See, e.g., O’Keefe, 132 F.3d at 1253 (DOJ directed investigative agents to
make ex parte contacts with employees of McDonnell Douglas without the consent
of McDonnell Douglas’ counsel, where such contacts went to the core issues in the
government’s False Claims Act investigation); United States v. Sabean, No. 2:15CR-175-GZS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136658 (D. Me. Oct. 3, 2016) (despite government knowing target was represented, law enforcement agents traveled to target’s
home and interviewed target from prepared outline that went to substance of investigation); In re Amgen, Inc., No. 10-MC-0249 (SLT) (JO), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63043 *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011) (although the government initially accepted
company counsel’s assistance in reaching out to company employees, the government “abandoned this protocol and began to contact the employees directly, attempting to conduct interviews and to subpoena documents in their possession.”).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (employee
reached out to government to express concern that company lawyer might pressure her to commit perjury).
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These overt practices largely go unchecked because the target company, once it learns of the ex parte contact, cannot afford to lodge a formal, or even firm, objection. Doing so could jeopardize earning precious
“cooperation credit” that the target company seeks in order to reduce any
applicable fines or penalties if it came out on the losing end of an adjudication on the underlying merits of the case.32 DOJ rakes in billions of
dollars annually in matters against target companies that are overwhelmingly resolved short of a trial and which come under the label of “deferred—[or] non—prosecution agreements” for criminal matters, or civil
false claim settlements. Because companies are understandably driven by
the economic bottom line, there is often little incentive to engage in protracted adversarial proceedings with DOJ but, instead, boards of directors
and senior management deem it better to write a check, agree to certain
internal remedial measures, then move on, which is often the desire of
shareholders and other stakeholders. The result leaves DOJ more emboldened to push its practices to an unlawful limit, much like a bully who
operates unchecked will persist in intimidation until someone says enough
is enough. Twenty-three years ago, after DOJ’s arrogant self-exemption
from no-contact rules, the light shone on these unethical practices, leading to passage of the McDade Amendment.
Historically, DOJ, through publication of its DOJ Manual (“Justice
Manual” formerly known as the United States Attorney Manual
(“USAM”)) has set forth, among other things, agency guidelines that it
undertakes to follow in carrying out investigations and prosecutions.33
Tellingly, after passage of the McDade Amendment, DOJ, in the 2005 version of the Justice Manual, addressed the subject of ex parte communications, quite clearly showing that DOJ was sensitive to the issues associated
with such contacts with an eye towards complying with the applicable
rules. Like the 2005 version, the current Justice Manual states as follows:
Communications with Represented Party
Department attorneys are governed in criminal and civil law
enforcement investigations and proceedings by the relevant rule
of professional conduct that deals with communications with represented persons. In determining which rule of professional conduct is relevant, Department attorneys should be guided by 28
C.F.R. Part 77 (1999). Department attorneys are strongly encouraged to consult with their Professional Responsibility Officers or supervisors—and, if appropriate, the Professional
32. Justice Manual § 9-28.700—The Value of Cooperation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.700 [https://perma.cc/BM8B-VAKS] (last updated Nov. 2018)
(“Cooperation is a mitigating factor, by which a corporation—just like any other
subject of a criminal investigation—can gain credit in a case that otherwise is appropriate for indictment and prosecution.”).
33. See generally Justice Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
jm/justice-manual [https://perma.cc/N3BM-QQZT] (lasted updated 2018).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2022], Art. 9

954

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: p. 947

Responsibility Advisory Office—when there is a question regarding which is the relevant rule or the interpretation or application
of the relevant rule.34
The 2005 version of the Justice Manual further expounded on the
subject of ex parte communications. Following citation to Rule 4.2, the
Justice Manual articulated several considerations for DOJ lawyers to analyze in determining whether a particular communication with a represented person is proper in the governing jurisdiction. Among the
considerations cited was whether formal proceedings have been filed
against the represented person. Regarding this, the 2005 Justice Manual
properly acknowledged that “[m]ost states apply the contact rule to a represented person whether or not a complaint, indictment, or other charging instrument has been filed.”35
Another consideration flagged by the 2005 Justice Manual concerned
the treatment of employees when an organization is represented. In so
doing DOJ gave a nod to Rule 4.2, Comment 7:
The contacts rules vary from state to state in how they define a
“represented person” when that “person” is an organizational entity. Some states prohibit communications only with those highlevel employees who can bind the organization in the matter on
which the organization is represented. Other states prohibit
communications concerning the matter in representation with
persons having managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization. Many states prohibit communications with any person whose act
or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. And a number of states
preclude contact with a corporate employee or constituent whose statement
may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.36
In contrasting covert contacts with overt contacts, the 2005 version of
the Justice Manual acknowledged, “[g]enerally, the case law recognizes
covert contacts in non-custodial and pre-indictment situations as ‘author34. Id. § 9-13.200—Communications with Represented Persons (last updated 2020)
(internal citations omitted).
35. Id. § 296—Communications with Represented Persons—Issues for Consideration
(last updated May 2005); see also United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d
Cir. 1988) (“The timing of an indictment’s return lies substantially within the control of the prosecutor. Therefore, were we to construe the rule as dependent upon
indictment, a government attorney could manipulate grand jury proceedings to
avoid its encumbrances.”); Talao, 222 F.3d at 1139 (“Under these circumstances,
involving fully defined adversarial roles, impending grand jury proceedings, and
awareness on the part of the responsible government actors of [company employees’] ongoing legal representation, [California’s no-contact rule] governed AUSA
Harris’s pre-indictment, non-custodial communications with [employee].”).
36. Justice Manual § 296—Communications with Represented Persons, supra note
33 (emphasis added).
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ized by law,’”37 while noting that “[a] few courts have recognized such an
[authorized by law] exception in connection with overt, pre-indictment
contacts during a criminal investigation.38
The 2005 Justice Manual, as well as prior versions, also included what
was titled the Criminal Resource Manual (“CRM”). The CRM illuminated
the agency rules with more specificity. Regarding permitted overt communication, the CRM prescribed what type of overt communications are
permitted:
A Department attorney may communicate directly, or may cause
another to communicate, with a represented person concerning
the subject matter of the representation in the following
circumstances.
A. The communication is limited to determining whether
the person is in fact represented by counsel concerning
the subject matter of the investigation or proceeding.
B. The communication is made pursuant to discovery procedures or judicial or administrative process in accordance with the orders or rules of the court or other
tribunal where the matter is pending, including but not
limited to testimony before a grand jury or the taking of
a deposition, or the service of a grand jury or trial subpoena, summons and complaint, notice of deposition,
administrative summons or subpoena, or civil investigative demand.39
What the manual did not say is that overt ex parte communications are
encouraged or permitted, save for the narrow exceptions of CRM section
297, implying that operating outside these exceptions was atypical and
problematic.
Curiously, in 2018, DOJ quietly dropped the CRM, with the abovediscussed guidance, from the Justice Manual. The current version retains
the general provision that reminds DOJ lawyers that they are subject to
applicable rules of professional responsibility and that the lawyers “are
strongly encouraged to consult with their Professional Responsibility Officers or supervisors—and, if appropriate, the Professional Responsibility
Advisory Office—when there is a question regarding which is the relevant
37. Id. (internal citations omitted).
38. Id. (first citing United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1983); then
citing United States v. Binder, 167 F. Supp. 2d 862 (E.D.N.C. 2001)). As discussed
in Part VI infra, cases permitting such overt contacts go against not only the weight
of authority but the fundamental basis for the doctrine of the attorney-client
privilege.
39. Justice Manual § 297—Overt Communications with Represented Person—Circumstances Not Covered by the Contact Rule, supra note 33 (archived content from the
U.S. Department of Justice website).
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rule or the interpretation or application of the relevant rule.”40 The inescapable inference is that DOJ no longer wanted to be constrained by its
own expressed guidance in the 2005 Justice Manual, which had simply
brought DOJ lawyers in line with the same ethics rules that every other
lawyer is bound to follow.
The inference that the sub silentio removal of the agency rules pertaining to ex parte contacts was intended to cast off internal restraints is well
supported by a recently reported case. In an emphatic rebuke of DOJ’s
practices, a federal district court judge in Pennsylvania granted an emergency motion by Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, ordering DOJ to cease all
overt ex parte contacts with Glenmark executives in India.41 In this criminal price-fixing case, Glenmark complained that despite DOJ knowing that
its Indian executives were represented by Glenmark counsel, the government refused to cease the contacts in violation of the Pennsylvania nocontact rule. Glenmark argued:
To make matters worse, when Glenmark’s counsel learned of
these improper contacts, the Antitrust Division refused to stand
down, ignoring undersigned counsel’s repeated representations
that Glenmark India and its executives are represented parties,
and taking the position that these matters are not the business of
Glenmark’s counsel . . . . [Such conduct also] raises serious Fifth
Amendment concerns.42
Providing a glimpse into DOJ’s strong-arm tactics, Glenmark reported that
DOJ told them that it would cease the contacts only if the Glenmark attorneys stayed out of the matter and the executives retained separate counsel,
although DOJ apparently never proffered either before or during the
hearing that a conflict of interest actually existed that mandated separate
counsel being retained. Accordingly, Glenmark argued:
On this record, the government has no standing to object to
Glenmark’s counsel representing senior executives that the company is being compelled to produce for interview, and no power
to bar Glenmark’s counsel from representing them and the company which they can bind with their statements . . . .43
The Glenmark court therefore ruled, “The United States and its counsel are further ordered to transmit this order to their Indian counterparts.
40. Id. § 9-13.200—Communications with Represented Persons.
41. United States v. Teva Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 20-200, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 197791 (E.D. Pa. 2021); see also, Khorri Atkinson, DOJ Barred from Interviewing Glenmark Execs Without Attys, LAW360 (July 28, 2021), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1407591/doj-barred-from-interviewing-glenmark-execs-without-attys
[permalink unavailable].
42. Atkinson, supra note 41.
43. Id.
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The United States and its counsel will confirm in writing to this court that
such transmission has occurred.”44
V.

DOJ LEGAL ADVOCACY

ON

OVERT EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS—POSTMCDADE

Before Glenmark, there was a paucity of case law deciding squarely
whether DOJ’s use of overt ex parte contacts violated applicable ethics
rules. United States v. Koerber45 provides the most comprehensive and thorough analysis of the various issues that arise in such cases.
Koerber, a Utah business owner, was the target of a DOJ white collar
investigation involving potential wire and securities fraud and tax violations. Despite the fact that DOJ lawyers and law enforcement agents had
actual knowledge that Koerber had been represented by four different
lawyers over the prior several years of the investigation, a DOJ lawyer directed the agents to conduct two overt ex parte interviews of Koerber.46
During the first interview, Koerber clearly stated that he believed he was
still represented by counsel.47 The court found this to be a violation of
Utah’s no-contact rule:48 “The Government violated [Utah’s no-contact
rule] when it contacted and interviewed Defendant knowing him to be
represented by counsel without first obtaining his counsel’s consent or
court approval.”49 Further, during the second interview the government
inquired about whether Koerber would rely on an advice of counsel defense; in response, the court found that:
[T]he Government violated Rule 4.2(e)(1), which provides that
“[w]hen communicating with a represented person pursuant to
this Rule, no lawyer may inquire about privileged communications between the person and counsel or about information regarding litigation strategy or legal arguments of counsel or seek
to induce the person to forgo representation or disregard the
advice of the person’s counsel.” As instructed by the prosecutors,
the agents asked Defendant during the second interview whether
he would be willing to waive privilege and whether he intended
44. Id.
45. 966 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2013).
46. Id. at 1213.
47. Id. at 1215.
48. Similar to Model Rule 4.2, Utah’s no-contact rule provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent
of the other lawyer . . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may,
without such prior consent, communicate with another’s client if authorized to do so by law, rule, or court order . . . .
Utah Rules of Prof’l Conduct § 04.02(a) (Nov. 1, 2005), https://
www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/approved/2005/11/RPC04.02.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F3KS-ZBUA].
49. Koerber, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
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to rely on an “advice of counsel” defense at trial, both prohibited
inquiries under Rule 4.2(e)(1).50
The government argued that even assuming it had actual knowledge
of Koerber’s legal representation, the ex parte contact was nevertheless
“authorized by law” as set forth in the Utah ethics rules.51 In rejecting this
argument, the court explained:
The Government, however, argues that even if it knew of Defendant’s representation, its ex parte contact and interviews of Defendant were within the “authorized by law” exception contained in
the Rule, which provides that “an attorney may, without such
prior consent, communicate with another’s client if authorized
to do so by any law, rule, or court order . . . . The Government’s
summary, however, omits “covert” or “undercover” as a qualifier
in describing the ex parte contacts that are within the ‘authorized
by law’ exception as expressed in Ryans.52
The court squarely rejected the notion that there was a safe haven for
the DOJ practices under review:
The court does not accept that it is a “well-established investigatory technique” for the IRS and FBI to jointly interview a target
known to be represented by counsel at the instruction of prosecutors . . . . To the contrary, the court finds that this technique is
off limits, both by operation of Utah’s no-contact rule and as a
result of the internal policies of all the agencies/offices involved
in the investigation and prosecution of Defendant . . . .53
In Ryans, cited in Koerber, the court, like some courts in other jurisdictions applying their respective no-contact rules, used broad language that
could be construed to exempt government attorneys from following local
ethics rules in more situations than just the use of traditional covert investigatory contacts.54 The Koerber court addressed this ambiguity head on:
The Government’s citation to and reliance on Ryans to justify its
approach in instructing the agents to contact Defendant outside
the presence of his known counsel is misplaced. First, despite
broad language in the Court’s analysis, Ryans (and its progeny,
including in other jurisdictions) related to covert investigation
techniques in the noncustodial, pre-indictment investigation of a
represented target. In supplemental briefing, the Government
did not provide any cases in which undercover or covert police
50. Id. at 1225 n.1.
51. Id. at 1227–28.
52. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731
(10th Cir. 1990)).
53. Id. at 1232 (footnote omitted).
54. See Ryans, 903 F.2d at 740.
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operations did not similarly define the analysis. Ryans is therefore straightforwardly distinguishable on that basis alone, given
that, in this case, the Government initiated overt communications with
Defendant rather than pursuing the investigation through use of
an undercover informant as in Ryans or through other covert
means.55
The court finds therefore that the current Utah Rule 4.2(a) . . .
prohibits overt ex parte communications with any person known
to be represented in the matter “whether or not the person is a
party to a formal legal proceeding.”56
The court also found that not only did the government’s ex parte
contact violate Utah’s no-contact rule but necessarily violated federal law
in the form of the McDade Amendment, as well as governing DOJ and IRS
agency rules.57 Because these rules were promulgated to protect citizens’
fundamental rights, the court found a due process violation, requiring
suppression of the two interviews:
Suppressing the two interviews and all fruit derived therefrom is
necessary here to protect Defendant’s due process rights. And,
from a policy perspective, excluding the evidence under the circumstances of this case will help overcome a natural disincentive
within the agencies involved to monitor the conduct of their attorneys and agents and ensure their compliance with internal
procedures that protect citizens’ rights and implicate due process. In addition, suppression in this case will help prevent the
erosion of “citizens’ faith in the evenhanded administration of
the laws.”58
It is notable that when Koerber was decided in 2013, the 2005 version
of Justice Manual then in effect included the provisions regarding ex parte
contacts discussed supra, setting forth guidance to DOJ lawyers as well as
limitations and considerations to be evaluated before engaging in such
contacts. The Koerber court found it curious that the DOJ lawyers before it,
in arguing on multiple grounds that they had committed no violation,
were essentially taking positions directly at odds with their agency’s own
rules:
55. Koerber, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 1231-32.
57. Id. at 1236 (“[A]n agency of the federal government must scrupulously
observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to
do so, its action cannot stand and courts will strike it down.” (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1969)).
58. Id. at 1245 (quoting United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.
1970)).
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The Government’s implicit dismissal of the insightful Utah
State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 95–05 is particularly curious in light of the instruction that federal prosecutors should be
guided by precisely this interpretation. The USAM [Justice Manual] also notes that “[m]ost states apply the contact rule to a represented person whether or not a complaint, indictment, or
other charging instrument has been filed.” By contrast, the Government argued forcefully against this notion . . . . Most tellingly,
however, the USAM specifically outlines the “overt communications” that are permissible with “represented persons”:
A Department attorney may communicate directly, or may
cause another to communicate, with a represented person concerning the subject matter of the representation in the following
circumstances.
A. The communication is limited to determining whether
the person is in fact represented by counsel concerning
the subject matter of the investigation or proceeding.
B. The communication is made pursuant to discovery procedures or judicial or administrative process in accordance with the orders or rules of the court or other
tribunal where the matter is pending, including but not
limited to testimony before a grand jury or the taking of
a deposition, or the service of a grand jury or trial subpoena, summons and complaint, notice of deposition,
administrative summons or subpoena, or civil investigative demand.59
Koerber’s reasoning, as it pertains to whether overt, non-custodial, preindictment contacts are prohibited under applicable ethics rules, has not
come under serious attack in the years since the ruling was issued. While
some cases have deemed such contacts permissible, they have done so
under a blanket exemption for all pre-indictment contacts, whether covert
or overt.60 The illogic behind this blanket exemption simply does not
withstand muster in the context of overt communications, as tacitly acknowledged by DOJ in the now-defunct 2005 Justice Manual provisions
discussed above.
There has been no ascertainable public explanation by DOJ as to why
the prior Justice Manual, which included the helpful rules on ex parte
contacts, has been withdrawn. Given the clear impact of these defunct
rules on the attorney-client privilege, one would have expected DOJ to
59. Id. at 1243–44 (internal citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Sabean, No. 2:15-CR-175-GZS, 2016 WL 5721135,
at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 3, 2016) (overt ex parte interview of defendant by government
agents not a violation Maine’s no-contact rule inasmuch as “prohibition on contact
begins when there is an ‘accused,’ thereby marking the actual commencement of
criminal proceedings”).
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speak clearly.61 Instead, given DOJ’s subsequent bullyish practices, reported62 and unreported, we are left to ascribe an improper motive. With
the agency rules cited in Koerber now removed, it would seem that the argument that overt ex parte contacts violate DOJ agency rules, can no longer
be as cleanly made, which presumably was the whole point behind their
removal.
Yet, even with DOJ’s express agency rules having been watered down,
DOJ cannot use this maneuver to condone practices that nevertheless violate applicable state ethics rules, as mandated by the McDade Amendment. As was made clear in Koerber, the now-defunct agency rules were
consistent with the preferred interpretation of state ethics rules that requires DOJ to more faithfully respect the attorney-client relationship.
Therefore, the sound reasoning of Koerber with its interpretation of the
Utah no-contact rule should still inform other courts grappling with the
question under other similar state ethics rules.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, DOJ, instead of silently retreating to its pre-McDade Amendment culture, would be held to comply with Koerber and applicable state
law ethics rules, which have not changed and are still the operative law
regarding contact—by government attorneys or others—with represented
parties. One can hope that with fresh leadership at DOJ, the agency will
take the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to practices and related
rules interpretations in a way that is most consistent with honoring, and
not trampling, the sacrosanct attorney-client privilege, particularly for corporate and other organization employees who are represented by counsel.
61. One of the proclamations of the Justice Manual is that “[c]ompliance with
Government ethic rules and rules of professional conduct supports the credibility
of and faith in government decisions and promotes the common good.” Justice
Manual § 1-4.010—Introduction, supra note 33 (providing more, not less, clarity to
DOJ lawyers after the ex parte rules were watered down could have enhanced the
credibility of the government in its practices).
62. See United States v. Teva Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 20-200, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 197791 (E.D. Pa. 2021).
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